The Imperial Japanese Navy had been planning for war against the United States since the 1920s, and it did a very good job of maximizing its advantages and minimizing its risks, given how outnumbered it was. In their initial operations against the Allied Powers in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, the Japanese inflicted one of the most rapid, decisive, and humiliating defeats in world history. And yet, as Willmott notes, “One could not ignore the simple fact that not a single operation planned after the start of the war met with success,” (Ch. 3). Brilliant tactical planning and execution did nothing to move Japan towards a political solution to the war. The focus on how to win had eclipsed any discussion of whether or not to fight at all.
Nothing exemplifies this better than the controversy over the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, which limited British, American, and Japanese fleets to a 5:5:3 ratio. Leadership in the IJN was furious, and denounced it as treasonous because they saw it as impeding their plans for fleet expansion. Of course, Japan physically couldn’t build such a fleet, as the Japanese diplomats understood, and this balance of force was better than an all-out arms race, which the Empire would lose. But as the IJN waxed in influence and power, their demands won out, and in 1934, Japan renounced the treaty. The operational demands of the fleet had once again overtaken the political demands of geostrategic stability.
If there is a lesson from this bit of history, it’s that it is possible to achieve the objectives of your campaign and still lose the war—and you’re more likely to do so if you’re not thinking rigorously about why you’re fighting the war and what you want to gain from it. And so, perhaps unsurprisingly, this has seemed ever-more relevant as we enter the third month of Trump and Netanyahu’s misbegotten war on Iran.
As of now, there is a ceasefire in place, and negotiations ongoing to try and reach a settlement. It is difficult to say how likely these talks are to succeed, given that American and Israeli objectives have been so incoherent. At various times we have proclaimed that our goal is “destroying the Iranian nuclear program” or “regime change” or “securing freedom of navigation” or “degrading Iranian capabilities” or “stealing their oil”, but if you pay attention to the press releases and statements, a pattern does begin to emerge. We hear boasts about the number of combat sorties, lists of Iranian air and naval assets destroyed, reports on leaders assassinated, and estimates of Iranian missile launchers rendered inoperable or drones shot down.